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[Crim. Xo. 5317. In Bank. May 13, 1952.] 
In re Frances Barr, on behalf of GEORGE BARR, on 
Habeas Corpus. 
[1] Appeal-Supersedeas-Proceedings on Violation.-Superse-
deas is the usual remedy when an appellant seeks to vacate 
proceedings taken in the lower court in violation of a stay 
granted by statute. 
[S] Divorce-Custody of Children-Appeal-Stay of Proceedings. 
-In child custody actions, habeas corpus is a remedy addi-
tional to supersedeas to correct violations of a stay granted 
by statute pending appeal, since the writ will lie when a per-
son entitled to custody of a minor child is denied possession 
thereof. 
[3] .Id.-Custody of Children-Appeal-Effect.-Appeal from an 
order modifying the custody provisions of a divorce decree 
suspends the power of the trial court to enforce such order. 
(Code Civ. Proc., §§ 946,949.) 
~. [4] Id.-CustodY of Children-Appeal-Effect.-A perfected ap-r peal in an action for custody of a child automatically consti· 
:" tutes a stay of proceedings and precludes trial court from 
interfering with custody as it existed at time of appeal. 
[6] Id.-Custody of Children-Appeal-Stay of Proceedings.-
Where the mother appealed from an order which modified 
a divorce decree so as to award custody of a minor child 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, § 242. 
[2] See Cal.Jur., Divorce and Separation, § 142; Cal.Jur., Habeas 
Corpus, § 29; Habeas Corpus, § 78. 
f.· Kelt. Dig. References: [lJ Appeal and Error, § 440; [2-8] Di-
i vorce, § 288. 
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to the father, and the superior court thereafter denied her 
Illotion to stay proceedings and directed her to deliver the 
child to the father, it was not necessary for her to resist 
until she was cited for contempt, and her compliance with 
the order was not "voluntary" so as to deprive her of the 
right to apply for custody pending appeal pursuant to the 
statutory stay of proceedings. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 946, 949.) 
[6] ld.-Custody of Children-Appeal-Stay of Proceedings.-
Where trial court erroneously refused to stay enforcement 
of an order modifying the custody provisions of a divorce 
decree after mother of child had perfected an appeal there-
from, her right to haheas corpus to correct such wrongful 
refusal is not affected hy a suhsequent order granting her 
visitation rights. 
[7] ld. - Custody of Children - Appeal-Stay of Proceedings.-
While cases will arise where it would not he in the hest inter-
ests of the child to remain for the duration of an appeal from 
a modification order with the parent previously having custody, 
this possihility does not authorize extralegal seizure of the 
child hy the other parent or execution of the modification 
order hy the trial court in violation of express statutory pro-
visions suspending its power to enforce such order pending 
appeal. (Code Civ. Pro c., §§ 946, 949.) 
[8] ld.-Custody of Children-Appeal-Effect.-Welfare of a child 
imperiled hy remaining with the parent having custody thereof 
pending appeal from a modification order awarding such cus-
tody to the other parent may he adequately protected hy appli-
cation to the court having jurisdiction over the appeal or 
to the juvenile court. 
PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure custody of a 
minor. Writ granted. 
Coffey & Velasquez and Jack Coffey for Petitioner. 
Paolini & Paolini and Mario G. Paolini for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-On November 17, 1947, a final decree of 
divorce was entered dissolving the marriage of Frances Barr 
and George Barr. The decree awarded custody of their minor 
child to Frances. On.J auuary 10, 1952, upon application by 
George, the court modified the decree to award him the cus-
tody of the child. On January 14th, Frances filed notice of 
appeal from the modification order, and her appeal is pres-
ently pending in this court. Frances also filed a motion in 
the trial court to stay enforcement of the modification order. 
) 
.) 
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On January 24th her motion was denied and she was ordered 
to deliver the child to George. Later that day she complied 
with this order. 
On February 5, 1952, upon application by Frances, the court 
modified the order of January 10th to grant her visitation 
rights. On March 16th, while the child was with Frances 
pursuant to the visitation provisions of the February 5th 
order, she refused to return the child to George and informed 
him that she intended to keep the child. Later that day 
George and police officers entered her home and forcibly took 
the child. Frances commenced the present habeas corpus 
proceeding in this court on March 21st. She contends that 
her appeal stayed the January 10th modification order and 
that she is therefore entitled to custody of the child pending 
appeal. . 
The first question presented is whether this court; can prop-
erly issue habeas corpus in this case. [1] Supersedeas is 
the usual remedy when an appellant seeks to vacate proceed-
ings taken in the lower court in violation of a stay granted 
by statute. (Southern Pac. 00. v. Superior Oourt, 167 Cal. 
250,252 [139 P. 69] ; Romine v. OraUe, 83 Cal. 432, 437 [23 
P. 525] ; Holcomb v. Juster, 39 Cal.App. 462, 463 [179 P. 
445] ; see, also, Estate of Dabney, 37 Ca1.2d 402, 411 .[232 
P.2d 481].) [2] In child custody actions, however, habeas 
corpus is an additional remedy to correct violations of stay 
provisions (In re Lukasik, 108 Cal.App.2d 438, 446 [239 P. 
2d492]; In re Browning, 108 Cal.App. 503, 507 [291 P. 
650] ; In re Dupes, 31 Cal.App. 698, 701 [161 P. 276]), since 
the writ will lie when a person entitled to custody of a minor 
child is denied possession thereof. (In re Mathews, 176 Cal. 
~ 156, 158 [167 P. 873] ; see 37 Cal.L.Rev. 455, 473-474; 13 Cal. 
( Jur. 251~252.) 
~.. [3] Turning to the merits of the petition, it is clear that 
" the appeal suspended the power of the trial court to enforce 
the order modifying the custody provisions of the divorce 
decree. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 946, 949; Lerner v. Superior 
Oourt, 38 Ca1.2d 676, 680 [242 P.2d 321] ; Ex parte Quei-
rolo, 119 Cal. 635, 636 [51 P. 956] ; In re Dupes, 31 Cal.App. 
698,700 [161 P. 276].) [4] " [A] perfected appeal in an action 
for the custody of a child automatically constitutes a stay of 
proceedings and precludes a trial court from interfering 
with custody as it existed at the time of appeal. JJ (Foster v. 
r Hoster, 5 Ca1.2d 669, 672 [55 P.2d 1175] ; see In re Lukasik, 
, 108 Cal.App.2d 438, 443 [239 P.2d 492].) 
~. 
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[5] George contends that the foregoing cases are not con-
trolling here on the ground that Frances voluntarily com-
plied with the order appealed from. In his return to the peti-
tion for the writ, however, George admits: "That on the 
24th day of January, 1952, this Petitioner through her at· 
torney representing her at that time made a motion before 
the said Superior Court to stay and suspend all proceedings 
and enforcement of its Order of January 10th, 1952, award-
ing custody to the father; that the Superior Court denied 
said motion and instead ordered the Plaintiff to deliver said 
child to the father in conformity to said Order." (Italics 
added.) Frances telephoned George on the evening of the 
24th and told him to come to her house and take the child. 
Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that her com-
pliance with the order of the court was "voluntary." It was 
not necessary to resist until she was cited for contempt. (Of. 
Reitano v. Yankwich, 38 Ca1.2d 1 [237 P.2d 6].) 
George relies on De Lemos v. Siddall, 143 Cal. 313, 315 
[76 P. 1115]. In that case this court held that habeas corpus 
would not lie when the order appealed from was executed 
before the appeal was perfected, on the ground that an appeal 
preserved the status quo at the time of appeal and did not 
operate to undo action taken before the appeal. In the pres-
ent case the order was executed by the trial court some 10 
day's after Frances perfected her appeal. 
[6] Frances's right to habeas corpus is not affected by 
the February 5th order granting her visitation rights. Since 
the trial court did not have jurisdiction to modify its order 
after an appeal had been perfected (Lerner v. Superior Court, 
38 Ca1.2d 676, 680-681 [242 P.2d 321]; Vosburg v. Vos-
burg, 137 Cal. 493 [70 P. 473] ; Browne v. Browne, 60 Cal. 
App.2d 637, 642 [141 P.2d 428]), the order of February 5th 
did not operate to supersede the order of January 10th. 
Accordingly, Frances is not prevented from obtaining habeas 
corpus to correct the trial court's erroneous refusal to stay 
execution of the January 10th order. 
[7] Cases will undoubtedly arise where it would not be 
in the best interests of the child to remain for the duration 
of the appeal with the parent previously having custody. 
For instance, the very reason for modification of an earlier 
custody award may be that the parent having custody has 
been mistreating the child. In that situation it would obvi-
ously be undesirable to leave the child with the appellant. 
But this possibility· does not authorize extralegal seizure of 
J 
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the child by the other parent or execution of the modification 
order by the trial court in violation of the express provisions 
of the Code of Civil Procedure. Otherwise, litigants would 
be encouraged to seize possession of the child pending appeal 
in the hope that in subsequent. habeas corpus proceedings they 
could persuade an appellate court that their action was in 
the best interests of the child and that it should ratify their 
conduct by refusing to issue the writ. As colorfully pointed 
out in In re Browning, supra, 108 Cal.App. 503, 507, the child 
would be "in the category of a human football whose posses-
sion by either parent depends upon the agility, activity and 
determination of each." 
. [8] The welfare of a child imperiled by remaining with 
the parent having custody thereof may be adequately pro-
tected by application to the court having jurisdiction over 
"the appeal (Gantner v. Gantner, 38 Ca1.2d 691, 692 [242 
P;2d 329]) or to the juvenile court. (In re Lukasik, 108 
Cal.App.2d 438, 445 [239 P.2d 492].) There is no contention 
in the present case that the child may not safely remain with 
the mother pending the appeal. 
It is ordered that the child be delivered to the petitioner, 
who, pending determination of the appeal, is entitled to his 
custody pursuant to the terms of the final divorce decree. 
: .. Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, 
.:tT., and Spence, J., concurred. 
